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QUALIFICATION OF SECURITIES
IN CALIFORNIA: HOSTILE TERRITORY
FOR FOREIGN ISSUERS
by
JAMEs

K. RoosA*

INTRODUCTION

The California Department of Corporations' current policies regarding securities regulation reflect an extreme bias against takeover defensive measures contained in the articles and bylaws of foreign issuers offering their securities in California. These policies are objectionable on
two major grounds: First, they are entirely unwritten, and thus create
significant potential pitfalls for the unwary, foreign issuer whose articles
or bylaws contain these takeover defensive measures. Second, the effect
of eliminating these protective measures is to place the foreign issuer's
minority shareholders at a severe disadvantage in the event of a hostile
takeover.
The purpose of this article is to outline these policies and to discuss
the threat which compliance poses to the issuer's shareholders as well
as the corporation law of the issuer's home state. Although much of the
discussion is couched in terms of Ohio law and Ohio issuers, it applies
equally to other jurisdictions whose corporation laws are similar to Ohio's.
Defensive Measures Generally
In addition to Ohio's "control share" acquisition statute (Ohio General
Corporation Law § 1701.831) and other statutory provisions validating
the discriminatory (or "flip-in") aspects of shareholder rights plans, commonly known as "poison pills," many Ohio corporations elect to further
protect their shareholders from the potential abuses of a hostile takeover
bid through adoption of a variety of defensive measures, many of which
are included in their articles of incorporation or code of regulations. Ohio
General Corporation Law § § 1701.04 and 1701.11 give an Ohio corporation much leeway in drafting its articles and regulations, so long as they
are "consistent with law." Unlike some states (e.g., Delaware, New York,
and Wisconsin), Ohio does not presently have a business combination
statute, although one has been introduced in the Ohio legislature and
is expected to be enacted in the near future.
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Under Ohio General Corporation Law § 1701.59(CX1Xa), a director
is given the responsibility of protecting the corporation's shareholders
in the event of a change in control. To this end, he is entitled to consider
factors other than the amount of money offered by a corporate raider
(§ 1701.59(E)). For instance, does the raider intend to "milk" the target
or sell off its divisions after gaining control? It is this fiduciary responsibility to the corporation's shareholders from the potential abuses of a
hostile takeover that drives many of the protective measures discussed
in this article.
Notwithstanding criticism as management entrenchment devices,
defensive measures in some form have been adopted by most publicly held
corporations in Ohio, as well as across the nation. According to one study,
403 of the 424 publicly traded companies in the Fortune 500 have adopted
at least one defensive measure. (J.Heard & H. Sherman, Conflicts of Interest in the Proxy Voting Process 25 (Investor Responsibility Research
Center 1987)).
The Problem
ABC, Corp., an Ohio Corporation ("ABC"), wishes to sell its Common
Shares in various states, including California. ABC's blue sky analysis
indicates that no exemption from registration is available in California
for this particular offering. Pursuant to the California securities statute
and blue sky regulations, ABC submits the required state registration
materials to the California Department of Corporations ("Department").
Shortly thereafter, ABC receives a letter requiring compliance with
the following conditions in order to qualify its shares for sale in California:
1) Change ABC's code of regulations to provide that special meetings
can be called by 10% of the outstanding Common Shares (as opposed
to the current provisions which require 25% of the outstanding Common Shares);
2) Add a regulation providing for removal of directors at any time with
or without cause by 2/3 vote of all outstanding Common Shares (as
opposed to the current provisions which allow removal only for cause);
3) Eliminate the current fair price provisions in ABC's articles of incorporation and reduce the accompanying supermajority provision requiring an 80% shareholder vote for approval of certain transactions
with "interested parties" to 66 and 2/3%; and
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol23/iss2/6
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4) Change the current regulation providing for mandatory reimbursement of litigation expenses for outside directors to one which is permissive in nature.
The "FairnessStandard" and Foreign Corporations
The purported authority of the Department to impose these conditions on foreign issuers is vague at best (since the Department does not
cite any authority when imposing these conditions), but presumably is
derived from § 25240 of the California Corporate Securities Law of 1968,
which provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he commissioner may... deny]
effectiveness to... any qualification of securities ...if he finds (1) that
the order is in the public interest and (2) that the proposed plan of business
of the issuer or the proposed issuance or sale of securities is not fair,just,
or equitable, or that the issuer does not intend to transact its business
fairly and honestly, or that the securities proposed to be issued or the
method to be used in issuing them will tend to work a fraud upon the
purchaser thereof.' (emphasis added).
Significantly, California corporation law contemplates the presence
of foreign corporations. Under California General Corporation Law § 2115,
the corporation law of a foreign corporation (i.e. incorporated in a state
other than California) which establishes certain "minimum contacts"
with the State (more than 50% of the issuer's outstanding voting shares
held of record by California residents and more than 50% of its business
conducted in California) is displaced by California corporation law. This,
in itself is a radical approach to treatment of foreign corporations, and
creates the potential for difficult choice of law problems in the event of
litigation against the foreign corporation in its home jurisdiction. The
provisions of California corporation law which are specifically applicable
to a § 2115 Foreign Corporation include those imposed on foreign issuers
of securities as discussed above. Curiously, the 10% special meeting call
requirement for issuers of securities is not applicable to foreign corporations meeting the 50% "minimum contacts" test.
In the case of a foreign corporation doing business in California, §
2115 provides notice that by maintaining a significant presence in the
state, the corporation laws of the foreign corporation's home state will
be displaced by those of California. The problem, however, is that in the
case of foreign issuers of securities with perhaps a de minimis business
presence in the state, no analogous notice provision exists.
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The Ohio Approach
Resistance on the part of Ohio issuers to the conditions imposed on
corporations like ABC in our example is well-founded since the challenged
provisions are clearly legal under Ohio law and the potential impact of
compliance on the issuer's ability to protect its shareholders against
abusive tactics by raiders is significant.
1. Ten Percent Special Meeting Call
Ohio General Corporation Law § 1701.40(AX3) provides that meetings
of shareholders may be called by "persons who hold 25% of all shares
outstanding and entitled to vote thereat," unless otherwise provided in
the articles or regulations. In light of the presumption of the Ohio
Legislature that 25% is an appropriate proportion of share ownership to
call a special meeting, most Ohio corporations employ this percentage
(at a minimum). The 25% requirement is intended, in part, to minimize
the possibility of the company having to incur the expense and diversion
of management attention required in order to hold a special meeting
unless the raider has a reasonable degree of support and likelihood of
success.
2. Removal of Directors
Another common defensive measure employed by Ohio corporations
is that of the "staggered" board of directors. The staggered board structure has two interrelated aspects: First, directors can only be removed
for cause (typically defined in the regulations as gross negligence or willful
misconduct) which is permitted by Ohio General Corporation Law §
1701.58(C). Second, the term in office of a portion of the board expires
each year so that in the event of a partial takeover bid, a portion of the
directors in office prior to a takeover will remain in office long enough
to protect the interests of minority shareholders. In addition, this structure delays a total takeover since it typically requires several years to
replace all board members. The effect of allowing removal of directors
without cause is to render the staggered board useless as a defensive
measure and to leave minority shareholders without board representation in the event of a takeover.
3. Supermajority and Fair Price Provisions
Under Ohio General Corporation Law § 1701.52, an Ohio corporation may provide in its regulations that certain actions require a high
vote or "supermajority" of shareholders for approval. Supermajority voting
provisions typically require a raider to acquire 80-95% of a corporation's
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol23/iss2/6
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articles, which would otherwise require him to pay all shareholders in
a "two-step" acquisition the same "fair price" for their shares. Without
the benefit of a supermajority provision, those shareholders not coerced
into selling out to the raider during the initial tender offer would be required to take whatever was offered to them for their shares in the second step merger (which would inevitably be less and perhaps different
consideration than was received by shareholders who tendered their
shares in the initial tender offer).
4. Indemnification of Outside Directors
Ohio General Corporation Law § 1701.13(EX5Xa) provides that, except in limited circumstances, expenses incurred by a director in defending a lawsuit resulting from his or her position as a director "shall be
paid by the Corporation as they are incurred, in advance of the final
disposition of the action, suit, or proceeding... ." (emphasis added). The
director to whom expenses are advanced must undertake to repay such
amounts if it is eventually proven that his or her actions were improper.
The effect of compliance with the California requirement that indemnification be made permissive, in the case of small issuers on whose board
of directors a seat is not sought after as keenly as a seat on the board
of a Fortune 500 Company, is to discourage qualified outside individuals
from becoming directors. The rationale behind California's requirement
that Ohio issuers change their regulations to make such indemnification permissive is vague, at best. In any event, the repayment provisions
contained in 1701.13(EX5XaXi) eliminate most (if not all) risk of abuse.
Options For Issuers
Ohio issuers confronted with the California requirements have several
(albeit limited) options:
1) Negotiation
This option typically entails engagement of local counsel and therefore
may prove costly. Even then, experience has proven that the California
Commissioner of Securities is inflexible regarding these unwritten
policies.
2) Administrative Hearing
A would-be issuer may challenge an order of the Commissioner denying or postponing effectiveness of a qualification (California Securities
Law § 205143).
However, where
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pressure, this alternative may not be viable.
3) Compliance
Aside from the effect of "undoing" an issuer's existing defensive
mechanisms, implementation of these changes will usually involve obtaining shareholder approval. Depending on the time of year, it may also
require a special meeting and the accompanying expense.
4) Abandonment of offering in the state of California
CONCLUSION

California's current unwritten policies regarding qualification of
foreign securities highlight the importance of finding an exemption from
registration whenever possible, since compliance may pose a direct threat
to the integrity of the issuer's corporation law as well as the rights of
its shareholders in the event of a hostile takeover. These policies are particularly frustrating since in many cases they involve substantive revision or "undoing" of charter provisions that have been carefully crafted
and implemented by the issuer to deal with specific abuses associated
with hostile takeovers. Curiously, the Department's review of a foreign
issuers defense measures excludes scrutiny of poison pills. In the case
of an issuer offering its shares in several states, the requirement that
it amend its charter documents in order to appease one state is extremely unfair and is a classic argument in favor of uniform securities regulation among the states.
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